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๐Ÿ“„ Participant 13 (gov/acc research - phase 1)

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Priorities Extracted from This Source

#1 Reduce concentration risk in public goods maintenance funding
#2 Increase visibility into single-maintainer dependency through pony factor metrics
#3 Improve ecosystem resilience for critical public goods
#4 Strengthen delegate ability to steer public goods development based on ecosystem needs
#5 Create funding mechanisms for onboarding co-maintainers and external contributors
#6 Model criticality and blast radius of maintainer loss

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user : Concentration risk: in the context of public goods maintenance funding for the Stellar ecosystem, our Public Goods Award structure (seems to / may) encourage single-maintainer projects. assistant : ### What specific governance challenge or problem are you observing? You've mentioned concentration risk around single-maintainer projects in Stellar's Public Goods Award structure. What specifically happens when projects have single maintainers that creates a governance problem? Is this about continuity risk if that person leaves, decision-making bottlenecks, or something else about how these projects operate or receive funding? user : It creates an imbalance between community delegates and the maintainers of critical ecosystem tools. Community delegates are broadly aware of trends and needs within the ecosystem. A funding program aims to steer public goods development in directions that are favorable for the ecosystem. Maintainers -- and especially solo maintainers -- do not inherently have access to this bird's eye view. There are two particular maintainers that are each responsible for 3+ critical public goods (by themselves). Their work is so critical that delegates are hesitant to provide them with anything other than positive feedback. Regardless of maintainer intent, they are generally too busy and not incentivized to gather ecosystem feedback. Staying in their roles as public goods monarchs, is the most robust way of making a stable living building FOSS on Stellar. This prevents delegates from steering e.g. a critical solo-maintainer's attention and effort from one public good to another based on ecosystem trends. assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? What have you observed that shows this imbalance is actually affecting funding decisions or ecosystem development? For instance, have there been situations where delegates wanted to redirect a maintainer's focus but didn't, or where critical feedback wasn't given? Are there specific tools or projects where you've seen this dynamic play out? user : The evidence is fuzzy and open to interpretation. I've observed that there is a lack of feedback for these 2 particular maintainers, compared to the projects that rely less on individuals, or are not yet as critical for the ecosystem. The power imbalance I present here is likely one of multiple causes of this challenge. I'm limited in what I can share because of delegate confidentiality. assistant : Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : Move on assistant : ### What approaches, tools, or mechanisms could address the governance problems we've discussed? Share any potential solutions you're aware of or have considered - these could be technical tools, process innovations, research directions, or organizational approaches. user : We're (we = subset of delegates involved in PG maintenance funding) currently considering creating awareness of maintainer concentration risk through the concept of "pony factor". The intuition is that clearly showing which projects have solo maintainers, will make it easier for delegates to speak up about their concerns. This is paired with a tooling component: a concrete pony factor metric is paired with a criticality score (transitive dependent count), and blast radius modeling. The intent is to make it easy to run scenarios like: what happens to the ecosystem when this particular maintainer is taken off their projects, e.g. due to life events or being hired away. Critical maintainers need continued funding, this is non-negotiable. We cannot force them into onboarding co-maintainers by threatening to cut their funding. The process change we're exploring is to make available additional funding that can only be spent on external contributors and the onboarding of co-maintainers, offering a path forward that makes public goods more resilient whithout threatening the livelihoods of critical maintainers. assistant : ### Which teams, projects, or researchers do you know are actively working on these solutions or related governance innovations? This helps us map who's contributing to solving these challenges. user : In this case: the SCF Public Goods Maintenance Working Group, see https://scf-public-goods-maintenance.github.io/ assistant : Would you like to share more solutions or identify additional actors working in this space, or should we move to wrapping up? user : Wrap up assistant : ### Thank you for mapping governance challenges and solutions Here's a summary of your contributions: **Problems Identified:** Concentration risk in public goods funding - The Stellar Public Goods Award structure may encourage single-maintainer projects, creating a power imbalance between community delegates and maintainers of critical ecosystem tools. Solo maintainers of critical infrastructure lack the bird's eye view that delegates have, yet delegates are hesitant to provide anything but positive feedback due to the critical nature of their work. This prevents effective steering of maintainer attention based on ecosystem needs. **Evidence Provided:** Observable lack of feedback for 2 particular maintainers (each responsible for 3+ critical public goods) compared to less critical or less individual-dependent projects. The evidence is somewhat fuzzy due to delegate confidentiality constraints, but the pattern suggests the power imbalance affects feedback dynamics. **Solutions & Approaches:** - Creating awareness through "pony factor" concept to make solo-maintainer situations more visible - Tooling component: concrete pony factor metric paired with criticality score (transitive dependent count) and blast radius modeling - Scenario planning: ability to model ecosystem impact when critical maintainers are removed - Process innovation: additional funding specifically for external contributors and co-maintainer onboarding (cannot be used for existing maintainer compensation), providing a path to resilience without threatening current maintainers' livelihoods **Active Contributors:** SCF Public Goods Maintenance Working Group (https://scf-public-goods-maintenance.github.io/) Your input will be synthesized with other participants' contributions to help build the gov/acc research roadmap. This will inform the visualization and workshop at EthCC, where we'll work on coordinated solutions to these governance challenges. Does this summary capture your main points accurately, or would you like to clarify or add anything?
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