Gov-Acc Pipeline.

user : The inability/lack of willingness of new mechanisms to be scientifically evaluated. In particular. Given a problem domain (eg. Delegations) how vendors pitch ideas, how the selection happens is oqpaque. When we see opportunity for innovation, discussion is poorly steered. See https://gov.uniswap.org/t/rfc-governance-logistics-improvements/25737/10 assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? You've pointed to the Uniswap governance logistics thread as one example. What patterns have you observed across that discussion or other contexts that show this lack of scientific evaluation is causing real issues? This could include specific proposals that were adopted without proper evaluation, missed opportunities for rigorous comparison, or consequences from selecting mechanisms without clear criteria. user : Since the identification of the problem and selection of the solution there has been zero communication as to the implementation, this thread was started Jul 2025. Despite pushback from several contributors there was limited opportunity for evaluating the solution space. As a result we have minimal clarity on how the core problem is actually being solved. assistant : Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : Related to this is how vendors pitch ideas; In another DAO a privileged vendor was awarded 100k to "R&D" the problem. However in their comms they still rely on community "feedback", this creates huge asymmetries. There is is cost to do good R&D and when we an paid vendor soliciting feedback from unpaid participants there is no motivation to help push the core work forward. We should be allowing broad participation in a level playing field. eg. If there is 100k budget. I would much rather see RFPs from several vendors; Top three are awarded 10-15k each; and then after proper research. The winning proposal is awarded a 70k budget. Currently we see DAOs paying a premium with zero competition or sane evaluation of the tender process. assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? Beyond the 100k R&D example you mentioned, what specific consequences have you seen from this lack of competitive evaluation? For instance, have you observed suboptimal solutions being implemented, budget inefficiencies, community disengagement, or other tangible outcomes that show this tender process issue is causing harm? user : Yes but this is all behind closed doors; People are expressing frustrations in the selection/tender process assistant : Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : Sure lets work on how people arrive at ideas in a DAO; Currently, most DAOs operate with little direction, i.e not moving towards a common goal. So its hard to contribute with respect to broader objectives. eg. If a DAOs core purpose is to generate revenue by doing X. How are we evaluating if the projects we are spending money on contribute to that objective? assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? What have you observed that shows DAOs are struggling with this lack of direction? For example, have you seen proposals funded that clearly don't align with stated objectives, contributors unsure what to work on, or resources being spread too thin without clear prioritization? user : I've seen projects that have been funded with 1M plus funding with zero oversight that does not contribute back to the DAOs core business model. assistant : Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : Sure lets address ossification in power; We have many cases where we see career "DAO contributors" spin the same program and oversight committees. In practice these so called committees becoming a centralising force and very rarely create processes or procedures that involve the broader token holder base. If DAOs are supposed to be a democratising force. Our decision system should be broad and inclusive not centralising. assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? What specific patterns have you observed that demonstrate this ossification of power is causing issues? For instance, have you seen the same individuals controlling multiple committees across DAOs, decision-making becoming more centralized over time, or token holders being systematically excluded from meaningful participation? user : 1. Role Concentration Across Committees: It’s common to see the same small group of “core contributors” occupying multiple committee or workstream seats simultaneously. Over time this creates a de-facto political class inside the DAO, regardless of how open the elections technically are. 2. Perpetual Renewal Without Contestation: Many committees are renewed with little to no competition. Elections become procedural rather than democratic, and incumbents almost always win due to information asymmetry and low voter engagement. 3. Process Creation Happens Internally, Not Publicly: Committees frequently develop policies, frameworks, or budgets internally and then present them to tokenholders only at the final approval step. There’s very little bottom-up input in the actual drafting phase. 4. Tokenholder Participation Decline: As more decisions get delegated to committees, tokenholders are increasingly relegated to rubber-stamping. In some DAOs, fewer proposals reach a truly open governance vote because committees act as de-facto gatekeepers. 5. High Switching Costs for New Contributors: Without structured onboarding or transparent pathways into committee seats, new participants face significant barriers to entry. That alone creates centralization simply through path dependence. assistant : Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : Sure assistant : Great! Let's move to Part 2. ### What approaches, tools, or mechanisms could address the governance problems we've discussed? Share any potential solutions you're aware of or have considered - these could be technical tools, process innovations, research directions, or organizational approaches. user : Signals Protocol Abstract Signals is a board-based on-chain coordination primitive where members lock an ERC-20 for time to express intensity of support on concrete initiatives. Each lock mints a transferable ERC- 721 that represents the right to redeem the underlying after expiry or earlier upon initiative acceptance. Boards are immutable configurations at deployment time: lock interval, maximum lock duration (in intervals), decay curve and parameters, acceptance criteria (owner/anyone gat- ing plus fixed and/or percentage thresholds), eligibility requirements for proposers and support- ers, inactivity timeout, and optional post-acceptance release timelock. The protocol integrates optional reward mechanisms: a multi-board IncentivesPool that distributes board-wide par- ticipation rewards via time-bucketed weighting, and a per-initiative Bounties contract backed by an allow-listed TokenRegistry. Boards are deployed via a minimal-proxy factory and ex- pose a simple lifecycle: propose, support (mint lock NFT), accept or expire, and redeem. This document preserves the system’s motivation and design goals while grounding the mechanisms in the shipped contracts and validated behaviors from tests and docs. - https://www.researchretreat.org/papers/paper/?venue=dacc25&id=6 assistant : ### Which teams, projects, or researchers do you know are actively working on these solutions or related governance innovations? This helps us map who's contributing to solving these challenges - whether it's teams building tools like Signals, researchers studying evaluation frameworks, projects experimenting with competitive tender processes, or others working on the problems you've identified. user : Participant 26 ([email redacted]) - Lighthouse Labs assistant : Would you like to share more solutions or identify additional actors working in this space, or should we move to wrapping up? user : https://trustgraph.network/ is another great tool assistant : Who's behind TrustGraph? Do you know which team or researchers are developing it, and how it addresses some of the governance challenges we've discussed? user : Yes my friend - https://x.com/JakeHartnell assistant : Would you like to share more solutions or identify additional actors working in this space, or should we move to wrapping up? user : Wrap up assistant : ### Thank you for mapping governance challenges and solutions Here's a summary of your contributions: **Problems Identified:** 1. **Lack of scientific evaluation of governance mechanisms** - Opaque vendor selection processes and poorly steered innovation discussions (e.g., Uniswap governance logistics) 2. **Asymmetric vendor engagement** - Privileged vendors receiving large budgets (e.g., 100k for R&D) while soliciting free feedback from unpaid community members, with no competitive tender process 3. **Lack of directional clarity** - DAOs operating without clear common goals, making it difficult to evaluate if funded projects contribute to core objectives 4. **Ossification of power** - Career DAO contributors concentrating roles across committees, creating a political class with centralized decision-making that excludes broader tokenholder participation **Evidence Provided:** - Uniswap governance logistics thread (started July 2024) with zero implementation communication despite community pushback - Behind-closed-doors frustrations with selection/tender processes - Projects funded with $1M+ without oversight that don't contribute to DAO's core business model - Role concentration across committees creating a de-facto political class - Perpetual committee renewal without contestation - Internal process creation with minimal public input - Declining tokenholder participation as committees become gatekeepers - High switching costs for new contributors **Solutions & Approaches:** - **Signals Protocol** - Board-based on-chain coordination primitive using ERC-20 time-locks to express support intensity on initiatives, with transferable ERC-721 NFTs and optional reward mechanisms - **TrustGraph** - Tool for governance innovation **Active Contributors:** - Participant 26 / Lighthouse Labs ([email redacted]) - Jake Hartnell / TrustGraph (https://x.com/JakeHartnell, https://trustgraph.network/) Your input will be synthesized with other participants' contributions to help build the gov/acc research roadmap. This will inform the visualization and workshop at EthCC, where we'll work on coordinated solutions to these governance challenges. Does this summary capture your main points accurately, or would you like to clarify or add anything?