Gov-Acc Pipeline.

user : hmm, is there a list? assistant : No predefined list - I'm here to capture **your** perspective as an independent delegate! The goal is to understand what governance challenges you're actually experiencing or observing in your work. This could be anything from: - Issues you face when evaluating proposals - Problems with how delegates are selected or compensated - Challenges with voter participation or engagement - Difficulties with information access or proposal quality - Concerns about power concentration or representation - Technical limitations of governance tools - Or anything else you've noticed that makes governance less effective What comes to mind when you think about the biggest friction points or problems in Web3 governance from your experience as an independent delegate? user : yeah let's take power concentration in voters and / or voting-fatigue assistant : ### What specific governance challenge or problem are you observing? When you mention power concentration in voters and/or voting fatigue - what exactly are you seeing happen? Are these connected issues for you, or separate problems? And in which contexts are you observing this most clearly? user : Are we talking about DAOs, or web3 gov more broadly? assistant : Great question - **web3 governance more broadly**. This includes DAOs, protocol governance, L2 governance systems, treasury management - any governance structure in the Web3 space where you're seeing these issues play out. So when you think about power concentration and voting fatigue - where are you observing these problems most acutely? Is it across multiple contexts, or particularly concentrated in certain types of governance systems? user : Okay, I'm going with DAOs for now, since this is my focus area. We do see many DAOs, where decisions are made by a handful participants, essentially being oligachies. This is due to concentration of voting power, but also lack of participation from other potential actors. This is not bad per se, but does contradict the "decentralization" motto. assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? You've identified this oligarchic pattern - what specific evidence have you seen that shows this concentration is actually problematic for these DAOs? For instance, are there examples of decisions that went poorly because of narrow participation? Data on participation rates? Specific DAOs where you've observed this playing out? Or other indicators that this matters beyond just contradicting the decentralization narrative? user : It's a bit difficult to say, this DAO has bad decision making, because it's more concentrated. You can easily track on-chain data, but the off-chain process (community discussions, forum, private chats, quality of operations) is at least as important. That's more difficult to measure. Decentralization is not an end in itself, I'd say it's good to foster different and diverse opinions and people in every on-chain org with a community product. They bring different perspectives. It's very hard work, to get different people together, though. assistant : So the challenge isn't necessarily that concentration leads to objectively "bad" decisions, but more that you're missing the diversity of perspectives that could lead to better outcomes or stronger community products? When you say "it's very hard work to get different people together" - what specifically makes that difficult? Is it the voting fatigue aspect you mentioned initially, or are there other barriers preventing broader participation even when people have tokens? user : Exactly. For product DAOs (probably the most widespread type, e.g. in difference to community DAOs), the goal is to govern a prodct, and help it survive and grow. There's the amount of governance people, they're often overlaps between ecosystems. There's the international setting, it's difficult to coordinate across time, langugaes and culture. There's a lack of compensation, since gov is typically voluntary work. And there's the operations, it's typically much less structured than in traditional companies. Sometimes the lack of meaningful governance, for ex. the DAO just being in place for regulatory arbitrage. assistant : You're pointing to multiple structural barriers - overlapping governance participants spread thin, coordination challenges, lack of compensation, weak operational structure, and sometimes governance theater. When you mention "overlaps between ecosystems" and the amount of governance work - are you seeing the same small group of people showing up across multiple DAOs because they're the only ones willing or able to do unpaid governance work? Is that part of how the concentration happens? user : Yes, but there's the other side as well. The ones being ble to do gov professionally, have to be active in multiple ecosystems, sometimes also selling their sevirces (i.e. DAO service providers). assistant : So there's a tension - professional governance participants need to spread across multiple DAOs to make it economically viable, but that same dynamic reinforces concentration because they're the only ones who can afford to participate seriously? Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : Another problem would be coordination / DAO operations assistant : ### What specific governance challenge or problem are you observing? When you say coordination / DAO operations - what's breaking down or not working? You mentioned earlier that operations are "much less structured than in traditional companies." What does that look like in practice, and why does it matter? user : In general, it's one of the core challenges to operate a DAO. Sometimes the companies / foundations are running the operations, sometimes it's DAO members or service providers, often it's a cooperation of both. Often times, there's a lack of formal resonsilibities and roles, missing accountability for previous decisions, delegates are not neccessrily reliable, there's not that mich structure. assistant : ### What evidence or examples demonstrate this is a real problem? What happens when this lack of structure, accountability, and reliability plays out? Are there specific examples you've seen - proposals that don't get implemented, initiatives that stall, resources that get wasted? What are the actual consequences of these operational breakdowns? user : There's smaller things like no strcuture in calls, missing on documentation, switiching up communication, projects beeing dependant on people volunteering. Sometimes DAOs tend to spend to much time discussing, and not enough time on implementing / executing. And of course, there's more major issues, like proposals not beeing (fully) executed, announcements not being fulfilled, communication stopping, and / or no consenquences for that. Accountability goes both ways, for delegates and the structure operating the DAO. The recent dispute in AAVE DAO is an example for unclear responsibilities, coordination dispute. assistant : The AAVE example is helpful - that shows how unclear responsibilities can escalate into actual governance disputes. When you say "accountability goes both ways, for delegates and the structure operating the DAO" - are you seeing different accountability failures on each side? Like delegates not following through on their commitments versus the operational structure (foundation/company/service providers) not executing on passed proposals? user : Yes, since delegates usually are voluntary or don't have a formal role, they're less obliged and or motivated to stay long-term. If there's a misalignment, they can choose to quit. There's low barriers, uncertainty and high fluctuation. The companies that "run" the DAOs, however, are usually structued as such. There's very different models, though, as to how involved they are in operations and who is responsble for execution. Unfortunatly, misalignment between these foups is a frequent thing. assistant : So you have high turnover and low commitment on the delegate side because of the voluntary nature, while the company/foundation side has more stability but often misalignment about who's actually responsible for execution? When this misalignment happens between delegates and the operational entities - what typically causes it? Is it about different incentives, unclear decision rights, or something else? user : That sounds about right. Depends very much on the model. In AAVE, it was a dispute as to who owns the rights on the product, I beleive. Sometimes it's lack of execution, sometimes inactive delegates, sometimes interla disputes. assistant : Would you like to share another governance problem, or should we move on to exploring solutions and who's working on them? user : Solutions please assistant : ### What approaches, tools, or mechanisms could address the governance problems we've discussed? Thinking about the power concentration, participation barriers, and operational/coordination challenges you've outlined - what potential solutions are you aware of or have you considered? These could be technical tools, process innovations, compensation models, organizational structures, or other approaches that might help. user : In terms of increasing the pool of delegates, there's e.g. delegate programs to train people how to contribute, compensation for delegates, focusing on delegates strategy wise. Regarding the votable supply, and org can invest in marketing for token holders to delegate, good governance ui/ux / platforms, incentivizing delegators. There's also lot of non-financial things you can do to increase community interest, espacially with regards to community delegates. assistant : ### Which teams, projects, or researchers do you know are actively working on these solutions or related governance innovations? Who's actually building or implementing these delegate programs, compensation models, governance platforms, or community engagement approaches you mentioned? user : There's many DAO experimenting. I've seen a few compensation programs for top delegates. And there's experimenting with different voting platforms / mechanisms. Not so much on the rest. assistant : When you say "many DAOs experimenting" - are there specific ones you'd point to as doing interesting work on delegate compensation or voting mechanisms? And on "not so much on the rest" - which aspects are you seeing the least innovation or experimentation around? user : I'd like to see more orgs prioritzing their DAO in terms of internal development, makrketing and community management. assistant : Which specific aspects - the delegate training programs, marketing to token holders, or the community engagement work - are you seeing the least organizational investment in? user : you mean in terms of cost? assistant : Not necessarily cost - more in terms of where you see DAOs actually putting effort and resources (time, attention, dedicated people, strategic focus) versus where things are being neglected. When you said you'd like to see more orgs prioritizing their DAO in terms of internal development, marketing and community management - which of those three areas is most commonly underprioritized? user : difficult to say assistant : Would you like to share more solutions or identify additional actors working in this space, or should we move to wrapping up? user : wrapping up sounds good assistant : ### Thank you for mapping governance challenges and solutions Here's a summary of your contributions: **Problems Identified:** 1. **Power concentration and participation barriers in DAOs** - Decisions made by handful of participants creating oligarchic structures, contradicting decentralization ideals and missing diverse perspectives needed for better community products 2. **Coordination and DAO operations challenges** - Lack of formal responsibilities and roles, missing accountability, unreliable delegates, insufficient structure leading to implementation failures and disputes **Evidence Provided:** - **For concentration**: Difficult to measure impact directly since off-chain processes matter as much as on-chain data; the real issue is missing diversity of perspectives for product DAOs - Structural barriers include: overlapping governance participants spread thin across ecosystems, international coordination difficulties, lack of compensation, weak operational structure, sometimes governance theater - Professional delegates must work across multiple DAOs to be economically viable, reinforcing concentration - **For operations**: Missing structure in calls, poor documentation, inconsistent communication, volunteer dependency, too much discussion vs. execution - Major issues: proposals not executed, announcements unfulfilled, communication breakdowns, no consequences - AAVE DAO dispute as example of unclear responsibilities - High delegate turnover due to voluntary nature vs. stable but misaligned company/foundation structures **Solutions & Approaches:** - Delegate programs for training - Compensation for delegates - Strategic focus on delegates - Marketing to token holders to encourage delegation - Improved governance UI/UX and platforms - Incentivizing delegators - Non-financial community engagement initiatives - Need for more organizational prioritization of DAO internal development, marketing, and community management **Active Contributors:** - Many DAOs experimenting with compensation programs for top delegates - Various organizations testing different voting platforms and mechanisms - Less experimentation visible on training programs, marketing, and community management aspects Does this summary capture your main points accurately, or would you like to clarify or add anything? user : sounds good assistant : Thank you for participating in phase 1 of gov/acc research, Participant 36! Your insights on the structural challenges facing independent delegates and the operational realities of DAOs will be valuable for building the research roadmap. It's particularly helpful to hear about the tension between professional governance participation and concentration, as well as the accountability gaps between delegates and operational entities. Your contributions will be synthesized with other participants' input to inform the visualization and workshop at EthCC. 🙏